INVESTIGATION | The network behind the Tiraspol protest: GRU, MGB and propaganda channels

The separatist regime in Tiraspol is organizing a protest against Chisinau's policies on Friday, October 23, accusing the constitutional authorities of economic pressure on the region and human rights violations. However, the tools used by the organizers to prepare the demonstration highlight the development of information influence mechanisms that could connect Russian structures, local services and propaganda networks, Deschide.md reports. 

According to Deschide.MD sources within the so-called Supreme Soviet in Tiraspol, the aim of such an operation would be to transform social discontent into an instrument of political pressure on the authorities of the Republic of Moldova.

The October 23 protest: local mobilization and regional political stakes

On October 23, a demonstration by the so-called "Transnistrian Popular Forum", led by separatist leader Vadim Krasnoselski, is announced in Tiraspol. The organizers invoke the effects of Chisinau's fiscal measures and accuse the constitutional authorities of economic pressure on the region.

The preparations include mobilizing participants from the localities and organizing transportation to Tiraspol. The regional publication “Novosti PMR” announced the transportation of interested persons from Slobozia, while the press reported on the planned traffic restrictions in the city. These elements demonstrate the existence of an organized mobilization, but also raise an important question – why is economic discontent being used to build a political message against Chisinau?

In a region controlled by a separatist administration and heavily dependent on Russia, such a demonstration can have both a local and a geopolitical dimension.

To determine whether the mobilization is part of a coordinated operation, the relationships between the organizers, administrative structures, and networks that promote the protest messages must be examined.

Informational-Psychological Operations Center in Tiraspol

In February, the GRU established an "Information-Psychological Operations Center" (IPC) in the Transnistrian region. The purpose of this structure would go beyond the Transnistrian space, targeting the information environment in the Republic of Moldova and neighboring states, including the European Union.

The Deschide.MD interlocutor, close to the so-called "committee for legislation, law enforcement, defense, security and peacekeeping activity" within the Supreme Soviet, specified that the need to create the COIP was argued as a result of the observation of "inactivity of local authorities" and "information attacks on the Operational Group of Russian Troops (GOTR)".

The location of the COIP in the Transnistrian region was not accidental, but presented to decision-makers within the GRU as an "ideal location" - in the vicinity of Ukraine, in the vicinity of the EU, lack of physical control over the region, the presence of GOTR and the necessary web infrastructure.

In this regard, the center was tasked with managing several Telegram channels, using troll networks, producing content for TikTok, promoting bloggers and experts, as well as using local media outlets to repeatedly distribute certain messages.

Thus, the following Telegram channels are connected to the COIP network: “Триколор над Днестром” (Tricolor above the Dniester), “Приднестровец” (Transnistrian), Приднестровская Правда (Transnistrian Truth), НП inform, MEDIAKILLER ПМР and others. Information operations are not limited to publishing news favorable to the separatist regime. They also involve selecting topics, repeating accusations, discrediting opponents and building a public image convenient for the actors who control communication.

MGB – local message executor

An important role in the mechanism described above would fall to the so-called "Ministry of State Security" (MGB) in Tiraspol, in particular Directorate No. 15 (Information Directorate). The employees of that department, some of whom are also the administrators of the aforementioned Telegram channels, are directly subordinate to the so-called Deputy Minister of the MGB, Vitali SukhodolskyHis name also appears in a 2022 investigation by RISE Moldova journalists regarding connections with Russian curators sent by the FSB to the Republic of Moldova.

Another person involved in the coordination was identified as Stanislav Larin, the deputy head of the MGB's "Defense of Constitutional Order" Directorate. According to the data obtained, he is the liaison person with representatives of the Russian Military Intelligence Service (GRU) and local media.

Led by Sukhodolsky and Larin, the employees of Directorate No. 15 of the MGB have the following tasks:

• supporting, promoting and financing political parties, NGOs, entrepreneurs, media and individuals whose activities coincide with the "state interests" of Transnistria;
• carrying out operational games regarding propaganda, disinformation, compromise campaigns and the delivery of erroneous data to the "enemy" in order to undermine the latter's activity;
• carrying out complex information measures with the use of technical means when conducting cyber attacks on target objectives;
• active use of MGB-controlled media, information platforms, journalists, video producers in producing materials that "correspond to the interests" of Transnistria.

How economic discontent is transformed into an information weapon

Fiscal measures and economic difficulties can generate real dissatisfaction. However, they can also be used to promote political messages that attribute full responsibility to Chisinau and present the Tiraspol administration as the victim of alleged economic aggression.

The mechanism used has several components:

• local mobilization: organizing the event and promoting participation;
• message orientation: focusing public discourse on accusations against constitutional authorities;
• media amplification: distributing images, statements and messages through local channels and online platforms;
• audience expansion: the taking over of messages by channels from the Russian Federation and the presentation of the protest as an expression of general dissatisfaction;
• external pressure: using the demonstration to support a certain interpretation of the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol before the international public.

These stages are present in the case of the October 23 protest and the messages distributed to people.

Russian propaganda and building an image convenient for Moscow

Amplifying messages through media channels in the Russian Federation could considerably expand the political impact of the demonstration.

A relevant precedent is the documentation, in October 2024, by Meta of a network of coordinated inauthentic behavior, associated with an operation that originated mainly in the Transnistrian region and targeted the Russian-speaking public in the Republic of Moldova.

The objective – pressure on Chisinau

A local demonstration can be used to convey a broader political message when its demands are transformed into a general accusation against the central authorities. In the case of the October 23 protest, the stakes would be to present Chisinau as responsible for the region’s economic difficulties and to reinforce the separatist administration’s image as representing the interests of the population.

Such a strategy aims to discredit reintegration policies, fuel distrust in constitutional authorities, and create additional pressure on the government in Chisinau.

In this context, the October 23 demonstration must be analyzed both through its economic demands and through the way participants were mobilized, the construction of political messages and their circulation in the information space.